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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE-WHETHER REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR
JUDGE TO GIVE INSTRUCTIONS RELATING TO CREDIBILITY OF DEFENDANT

WITNESS-Appellant who was convicted of committing a criminal abortion,
moved for a new trial alleging as error an instruction given by the judge to the
jury. The instruction singled out the defendant from the other witnesses, pointing to his high degree of interest in a verdict of not guilty, as reason for scrutinizing his testimony. The judge also warned the jury that it need not accept
blindly the testimony of the accused.1 Held, reversed, new trial ordered. Swan,son v. State, (Ind. 1944) 52 N.E. (2d) 616.
The court felt that singling out the appellant for special consideration was
error because it made it appear to the jury that the judge 2 was inclined to dis-believe the appellant. The court thought that all instructions pertaining to the
credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given evidence should be general and
apply to all of the witnesses alike whether testifying for the state or for the· appellant. It was held that only by following this rule would impartiality be secured and the appellant saved all the rights given by the statute which made him
a competent witness. 8 Most courts in the United States hold contrary 4 to the
Indiana case under discussion. That case, however, does follow a long line of
Indiana decisions. 5 The courts of Texas 6 and Oklahoma 7 have also held that an
1 State v. McKinnon, 223 N.C. 160, 25 S.E. (2d) 606 (1943).
The common law regarded the testimony of the defendant in a criminal action as
incompetent because his great interest in the outcome would ordinarily induce him
to lie.
2 At common law the judge was free to comment on the weight of the evidence so
long as he made it clear that his opinion did not have to be accepted by the jury.
HALE, HISTORY OF THE CoMMON LAW OF ENGLAND, 4th ed., 291 (1792). The federal courts still retain the practice. State v. Bartlett, 50 Ore. 440, 93 P. 243 (1908).
Also see note in 6 So. CAL. L. REv. 56 (1932) for additional states that follow the
old common-law rule.
a, "The following persons are competent witnesses.... The defendant, to testify
in his own behalf." Ind. Acts, 190 5, c. 169, § 23 5, p. 584.
4 "Although there is authority to the contrary, as a general rule, it is proper to
give an instruction calling the attention of the jury to defendant's interest in the result,
as affecting his credibility." 16 CoRPUS JuRIS § 2445c, p. 1021. Also see Lucius v.
State, II6 Ark. 260, 170 S.W. 1016 (1914); State v. Mannion, 82 N.H. 518, 136
A. 358 (1927); State v. Ray, 195 N.C. 619, 143 S.E. 143 (1928). See also note
22, infra.
5 Hartford v. State, 96 Ind. 46 I ( l 884). Scheerer v. State, l 97 Ind. I 5 5, 149
N.E. 892 (1925) and Davis v. State, 210 Ind. 550, 2 N.E. (2d) 983 (1936), with
strong dissenting opinion.
6 Salamy v. State, (Tex. Cr. App. 1931) 37 S.W. (2d) 1028, reversed lower court
though the instruction given was very fair. Also see Shields v. State, (Tex. Cr. App.
1898) 44 s.w. 844.
7 Hendrix v. United States, (Okla. Cr. App. 1909) IOI P. 125 said that it was
error to point out defendant's interest, but because the evidence was so overwhelmingly
against the defendant, a new trial was not given. Later Oklahoma decisions stated em-
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instruction is reversible error merely because it singles out the defendant from the
other witnesses and warns the jury of his special interest in the trial. Louisiana 8
and Idaho 9 follow this rule. In Mississippi 10 it is error to point out the defendant's special interest when the outcome of the trial depends upon whether
the jury believes the defendant or the witnesses· for the prosecution. In cases
where there is a great deal of evidence introduced for both sides, that court has
sustained an instruction calling attention to the peculiar interest of the defendant.11 Other courts 12 have held that instructions singling out the defendant for
special comment are undesirable because they tend to discredit defendant in
the eyes of the jury, but they do not consider them grounds for a new trial.
Although courts agree in condemning an instruction that defendant's testimony
should be given less weight than that of others,13 there is a great deal of confusion
as to what language will amount to a violation of this rule. The Iowa court
appears to a1low judges to comment freely for in State v. Walker the judge told
the jury, "you are not required to receive blindly the testimony of such accused
persons a_s true, but you are to consider whether it is true, as made in good faith
or only for the purpose of avoiding conviction." 14 The Arizona court 15
condemned a similar instruction, but refused to reverse on that ground. North
Carolina 16 and Alabama 17 also allow their courts to go a long way in singling
phatically that an instruction like that in the Hendrix case would constitute reversible
error no matter what the circumstances of the evidence were. Fletcher v. State, (Okla.
Cr. App. 1909) IOI P. 599.
8 State v. King, 135 La. II7, 64 S. 1007 (1914).
9 See Chatman v. State, 102 Miss. I 79, 59 S. 8 ( I 912). Also State v. Foyte,
43 Idaho 459, 252 P. 673 (1927).
10 Jones v. State, 154 Miss. 640, 122 S. 760 (1929). For the contrary result see
State v. Brown, 216 Mo. 351, II5 S.W. 967 (1909).
11 Poole v. State, 100 Miss. 158, 56 S. 184 (19n).
12 State v. Snyder, 146 Wash. 391, 263 P. 180 (1927). People v. Will (Cal. App.
1926) 248 P. 1078 severely criticizes such instructions, but a constitutional provision
allows reversals only when it is certain that an injustice has been done.
13 REm's BRANSON, INSTRUCTION TO JuRrns, 3d ed., § 41, p. 123 (1936);
6 So. CAL. L. REv. 56 (1932). See also People v. Gerdvine, 210 N.Y. 184, 104 N.E.
129 (1914); Hartford v. State, 96 Ind. 461 (1884).
14 State v. Walker, 133 Iowa 489 at 497, IIO N.W. 925 (1907) is very strongly
worded and would probably be reversed in other jurisdictions. Also see State v. Bird,
207 Iowa 212 at 216, 220 N.W. IIO (1928) where the court said that the "defense of
alibi is easily manufactured [ and difficult to disprove], and that juries are advised by
the courts to scan the proofs of it with care and caution."
15 Robertson v. Territory, 13 Ariz. IO (1910), affirmed, 188 F. 783, 108 P. 217
(1910).
16 State v. McKinnon, 223 N.C. 160, 25 S.E. (2d) 606 (1943). Testimony should
be received "with caution and scrutiny." State v. Williams, I 8 5 N.C. 643 at 666,
n6 S.E. 570 (1922). Defendant's testimony is to be regarded with suspicion. State
v. Lee; 121 N.C. 544, 28 S.E. 552 (1898).
17 Mosely v. State, 241 Ala. 132, 1 S. (2d) 593 (1941). Instruction not great
enough error to cause reversal when standing alone, but it may combine with other small
errors to cause reversal.
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out the defendant for special treatment. They recognize that such a procedure
is unfair, but the doctrine of stare decisis prevents a change.18 The Nebraska 19
and Illinois 20 courts allow instructions that point out the special ·interest of the
defendant, but such instructions must not discredit the testimony of the defendant
in the slightest degree. The warning of the judge that the jury need not accept
blindly the testimony of the accused, given in the principal case, would for example, be held reversible error by the Illinois and Nebraska courts.21 Another
troublesome question is whether the jury should be instructed that it "must" 22
consider the interest of the defendant when evaluating his testimony, or only that
it "may" 23 do so. The consensus of opinion 24 appears to be that the instruction
be in the latter form.

Edwin Bobs

See notes 16 and 17.
Donner v. State, 72 Neb. 263, 100 N.W. 305 (1904). Reversed because instruction said jury need not receive defendant's testimony blindly.
20 In People v. Arnold, 248 Ill. 169, 93 N.E. 786 ( 1910) instructions questioned whether defendant's testimony was made because true, or to avoid conviction.
Reversed.
21 See notes I 9 and 20.
22 Miller v. State, {Ala. App. 1926) 107 S. 721. The judge cannot command the
jury to take into consideration defendant's interest in the outcome of the trial.
28 The judge can instruct the jury that it may take into consideration the natural
bias of the defendant when weighing his testimony. Kyle v. State, (Ala. App. 1926)
107 S. 222; State v. Taylor, 105 W. Va. 298, 142 S.E. 254 (1927); Callas v. State,
151 Miss. 617, I 18 S. 447 (1928); State v. Mannion, 82 N.H. 518, 136 A. 358
(1927); State v. Quartier, II8 Ore. 637, 247 P. 783 (1926); State v. Greenier,
53 N.D. 558; 207 N.W. 226 (1926).
24 Id.
18
19

